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An independent wholesaler with many different upstream suppliers is likely to be better at market 
coverage than if it were the subsidiary of just one supplier.  But where wholesale efforts are focused 
on resolving externalities (by establishing and administering a directed marketing channel), efforts at 
expanding market coverage have greater marginal cost and will be commensurately retrenched, so 
independent wholesaling has a smaller payoff.  This suggests that directed marketing channels? in 
Japan known as distribution keiretsu? are more likely than others to be headed by a primary 
wholesaler that is vertically integrated with the manufacturer. We demonstrate the empirical validity 
of this by showing that foreign direct investment in Japanese wholesaling is heavily concentrated in 
marketing channels with relatively high incidence of distribution keiretsu.  These same  marketing 
channels tend to have a slightly lower rate of import penetration which is indirect evidence that 
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 Distribution Keiretsu, FDI and Import Penetration 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
      Although it is widely conjectured that Japanese marketing channels with vertical restraints (so-
called distribution keiretsu) are more difficult for foreigners than for domestic firms to penetrate there 
have as yet been no empirical studies of this hypothesis.  Data both on the incidence of distribution 
keiretsu and extent of foreign purchases by wholesalers is available from the 1986 survey of 
wholesalers conducted by MITI, for 80 different 4 digit s.i.c. lines of wholesale business 
(Unfortunately this is the latest such survey with this sort of data).  In the following I will attempt to 
analyze these data in a revealing way.  At the outset we need to reflect for a moment on why 
distribution keiretsu and import penetration are plausibly linked.  They are linked because effective 
marketing through channels with distribution keiretsu is more likely to require that the primary 
wholesaler is vertically integrated with the manufacturer, which for foreign suppliers entails their 
directly investing in Japanese wholesaling.  Impediments to inward FDI in Japan thus have a 
disproportionately adverse affect on import penetration through marketing channels with distribution 
keiretsu.  
     Distribution keiretsu is the name for a marketing channel in Japan with vertical restraints.  This is 
not really a Japanese peculiarity per se.  What are called ? directed marketing channels?  in the 
academic marketing literature of the US amount to virtually the same thing as distribution keiretsu.  
These are marketing channels in which the manufacturer, or sometimes a primary wholesaler, attach  
preconditions or contractual stipulations to the activities of downstream distributors of the product.  
The stipulations vary but fall under the broad heading ? vertical restraints? .  They include stipulations 
regarding prices (minimum price, maximum price, set price), stipulations of exclusivity, and customer 
assignments.  Antitrust law is preoccupied with the possibility that vertical restraints might be part of 
a cartel scheme, and in a few instances they have been shown to be that.  But economic analysis 
suggests that in many more instances vertical restraints are there to address externalities in marketing. 
 Where several retailers (wholesalers) with overlapping territories supply the same product, 
promotional efforts by any one increases demand for the others.  In the absence of special measures 
coordinating their efforts they each underinvest in promotional efforts, both from the point of view of 
the group and from the standpoint of economic efficiency.  The vertical restraints achieve such 
coordination and lower marketing costs.  This is a common feature of many economic models of 
vertical restraints. See for example Telser (1960) Mathewson and Winter (1984), or Rey and Tirole 
(1986).  Also see Flath (1989) for applications of such models to Japanese cases. 
     Where administering a system of vertical restraints is an important aspect of marketing, the 
manufacturer and primary wholesaler are more likely to be vertically integrated.  This is because the 
very  externalities that give rise to vertical restraints also lower the cost of vertical integration.  The 
many aspects of wholesale marketing that cannot be identified ex ante or verified ex post are 
necessarily left to the discretion of an independent wholesaler.  The economic incentive to perform 
these noncontractible tasks then resides in the market-determined sharing of economic rent between 
the manufacturer and wholesaler.  In general this incentive remains imperfect.  Vertical integration 
enables the manufacturer to direct the noncontractible wholesale efforts itself with consequent 
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improvement in outcome.   But in vertically integrating, the manufacturer necessarily foregoes the 
comparative advantage of an independent wholesaler at expanding market coverage.  An independent 
wholesaler that stocks many products and has many customers is better able to expand market 
coverage than if it were the captive subsidiary of just one manufacturer, even if it has less incentive to 
do so.  This is the fundamental tradeoff in integration of manufacturing and wholesaling: ability at 
market coverage (independence) versus incentive both at market coverage and resolution of 
externalities (vertical integration).  Externalities are likely to tip this calculation in favor of 
? incentive? , because efforts to widen market coverage have a lower payoff if externalities are 
present.  This is because widening market coverage increases the externalities and further complicates 
their resolution by raising the costs of administering a system of vertical restraints.  Thus where 
externalities are present, vertical integration between manufacturer and primary wholesaler is more 
likely.1  Vertical integration of wholesaling with manufacturing and administration of a directed 
marketing channel are complements in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts (1995).   
                                                             
1This same logic applies to vertical integration of separate wholesalers.  And as demonstrated 
by Nariu and Flath (1993) marketing channels in Japan with a higher incidence of distribution keiretsu 
tend to have fewer wholesale steps. 
     This study extends and complements several previous ones that have empirically analyzed 
integration of manufacturing and wholesaling in international sales.  Anderson and Coughlan (1987)  
analyze the choice between independent and integrated foreign distribution channels in 94 overseas 
operations of 36 U.S. based semiconductor firms.  They find that integration is associated with survey 
responses indicative of asset specificity and product differentiation.  Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) 
analyze the foreign marketing channel integration decisions of 510 Canadian manufacturing firms in a 
wide set of different industries.  They too found that survey responses indicative of asset specificity 
were associated with integration.  Sakakibara and Serwin (2000) find that Japanese multinational 
manufacturing firms affiliated with any of the six financial keiretsu were less likely than others to have 
made direct wholesale investments in the US.  They argue that these firms more than others have 
close and long-term relationships with general trading companies and this obviates their need to sell 
through US-based independent wholesalers if not themselves integrating into wholesaling? the Japan-
based general trading companies act as their wholesalers.  All of these studies identify the tradeoff in 
integration of manufacturing and wholesaling as between the superior control of salesmen that 
accompanies integration versus the economies of scale and scope that can be achieved in dealing 
through an independent wholesaler.  Roughly speaking, this is the perspective adopted here also, but 
with a twist.  Namely, the wholesale activities that benefit the most from close control of 
employees? activities pertaining to the administration of a directed marketing channel? actually 
compete with the ones that benefit from expanded scale and scope? efforts to widen market coverage. 
 In an extreme case, the choice between integration and independence might actually entail a choice of 
which of the two sorts of competing activities to perform at all.  This same kind of tradeoff has been 
highlighted by Baker and Hubbard (2001) as important in explaining the decision of shippers to use 
their own fleet of trucks or contract with independent truckers.   Independent truckers can not easily 
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be made to supply ancillary services such as careful off-loading of shipments, but are well positioned 
to find matching back-hauls.  Companies that use their own private truck fleets to deliver their goods 
face the opposite conditions.  Independence thus makes more sense where special non-contractible 
driver services have less value and foregoing them altogether might be the lesser of two evils.  In the 
language of Holmstrom (1999) we might best consider ? the firm as a subeconomy which regulates 
trade according to second-best principles?  (p.89).  
     To make these ideas precise we first develop a stylized example. We then demonstrate the ideas?  
empirical validity in addressing the issues raised in the opening paragraph, by showing that foreign 
direct investment in Japanese wholesaling is indeed heavily concentrated in marketing channels with 
relatively high incidence of distribution keiretsu.  These same  marketing channels tend to have a 
slightly lower rate of import penetration, which is indirect evidence that some impediments to inward 
foreign direct investment still existed in Japan in 1997, our year of observation. 
 
 
 2.  Economic Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment in Wholesaling 
  
    In this section we present a simple example that more precisely represents the economic forces that 
bear on a manufacturer? s choice to vertically integrate (i.e. directly invest) in wholesaling.   We begin 
with the calculations of a vertically integrated firm with regard to its wholesale activities.  
 
Vertically integrated wholesaler 
     Let s be the extent of the captive wholesalers?  activities directed at resolving externalities among 
downstream distributors, and let e be the extent of the wholesaler? s efforts to widen the market 
coverage.  We suppose that both activities add value but that more of either raises the marginal cost 
of the other.  Let the cost of these activities be C= ? (s+e)2.  Denote by V the value of these activities 
and specify:   
 
(1) V= ms + ge -se -? s2 - ? e2, 
 
where m>0 and g>0 are parameters determining the marginal product of wholesale activities. For 
products that require special promotion or service to be marketed effectively, special measures to 
align the interests of downstream firms are valuable and m is high.  For products such as convenience 
goods that require wide market coverage to be marketed effectively g is high.   The third term reflects 
our presumption that measures to widen coverage have a higher marginal cost the more extensive are 
activities aimed at resolving externalities, and vice versa. 
     The vertically integrated firm chooses positive values of s and e to maximize V.  There is no 
interior solution, only a corner solution.  The solution values depend upon the parameters as follows: 
 
(2) If m _g, then s*=0 and e*=g. 
If g _m, then e*=0 and s*=m. 
 
This implies that if m>g the value of wholesale activity is V= ?  m2, and if g>m the value is V= ?  g2.  
The vertically integrated wholesaler only engages in the activity with the greater marginal product.  If 
 
 4 
m=g then there are two solutions, both of which are corner solutions.  
 
Independent wholesaler 
Now consider the calculation of an independent primary wholesaler.  We introduce some 
additional presumptions in line with our earlier discussion.  First, we presume that an independent 
wholesaler? s efforts at widening market coverage have a greater marginal product than if the 
wholesaler were the captive subsidiary of a single manufacturer.   Second we presume that the 
wholesaler? s efforts are not contractible. Finally, bargaining between the manufacturer and 
independent wholesaler divides the economic rent equally.  Let the costs be the same as assumed for a 
vertically integrated wholesaler.  The total value becomes 
 
(3) V= ms + ? ge -se -? s2 - ? e2, 
 
where ? >1 reflects the presumed comparative advantage of an independent wholesaler at efforts 
devoted to widen market coverage.  The independent wholesaler chooses effort levels s and e to 
maximize its share in this value that results from bargaining. To keep matters simple we presume that 
neither the wholesaler nor the manufacturer have outside opportunities.  The wholesaler? s objective 
function in choosing the noncontractible levels for s and e becomes: 
 
(4) W=? (ms + ? ge) -se -? s2 - ? e2. 
 
Again there is a corner solution and its value depends on the parameters as follows: 
 
(5) If m _ ? g, then s*=0 and e*=? ? g.  
If ? g _ m, then e*=0 and s*=?m. 
 
This implies that if m>? g the value of wholesale activities is 3/8 m2, and if ? g>m the value is 3/8? 2g2. 
 The independent wholesaler only engages in the activity with the greater marginal product.  If m=? g, 
then there are two corner solutions. 
     The emphasis on asset specificity in the earlier empirical studies of FDI in wholesaling of Anderson 
and Coughlan (1987) and Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) is premised on a presumed association 
between asset specificity and non-contractibility of efforts.   For instance if wholesale efforts include 
special training of employees then any promised reimbursement for the costs of such training are 
subject to ex-post renegotiation and thus not credible ex-ante.  The choice of effort levels by an 
independent wholesaler are thus sub-optimal as in the present example.  Vertical integration resolves 
this sort of hold-up problem and so is associated with the special in-house training of employees.  In 
this line of thinking vertical integration achieves first-best effort levels but may have, presumably does 
have, some special disadvantages of its own that are avoided under independence.  In the example 
here the disadvantage of vertical integration resides in the superior ability of an independent 
wholesaler over a captive subsidiary wholesaler at some of the very efforts subject to hold-up.  





Comparing the two regimes 
     Introduce a variable ?  to indicate vertical integration or not.  ? =1 indicates that the primary 
wholesaler and manufacturer are vertically integrated. ? =0 indicates that the primary wholesaler is 
independent of the manufacturer. Total value depends on the parameters as follows (To simplify the 
expression we ignore the cases having two solutions): 
 
(6) If m>? g>g, then   V(=? ?m2 +(1-? )?m2)=? ? m2+?m2. 
[? *=1 and                          V*=?  m2] 
 
If ? g>m>g, then   V=? ?m2 +(1-? )? ? 2g2 
[if  ? 2g2/m2 < 4/3, then ? *=1 and V*= ?  m2].   
[if  ? 2 g2/m2 >4/3, then ? *=0 and V*= ? ? 2g2].   
 
If ? g>g>m, then   V=? ? g2 +(1-? )? ? 2g2 
[if  ? 2 < 4/3, then ? *=1 and  V*=? g2], 
[if  ? 2 > 4/3, then ? *=0 and   V*= ? ? 2g2]. 
 
     The meaning of this is actually straightforward. Under either regime only the activity with the 
greater marginal product is pursued.  But we also presume that efforts to expand market coverage 
have a greater marginal product if the wholesaler is independent.  In switching between regimes there 
might also be a switch in activities with only efforts to counteract externalities under vertical 
integration and only efforts to widen coverage under independence (true if ? g>m>g).  This would be 
decisive in favoring independence if and only if the greater comparative advantage of an independent 
wholesaler dominated the effect of noncontractibility (which would require that ? 2 > 4/3).  In the 
other cases, switching regimes would not switch activities but would only change their extent.  Under 
vertical integration there would be more intense efforts to counteract externalities (if m>? g>g) and 
this would be decisive in favoring vertical integration.  Under independence there would be more 
intense efforts to widen market coverage (if ? g>m), but this would only be decisive in favoring 
independence if the greater comparative advantage of an independent wholesaler dominated the effect 
of noncontractibility (which again would require that ? 2 > 4/3).   
     The above can be summarized succinctly in the following.  
 
Result: On the domain ? 2 > 4/3, V is supermodular in (? ,m,-g,-? ).  On the domain ? 2 < 4/3, ? *=1. 
 
Proof.  The second part of the result is evident by inspection of equation (6).  Regarding the first part, 
supermodularity means that the marginal return from increasing a variable (weakly) increases with 
each other variable. So for example denote by ? V/? m the marginal return from increasing m.  It 
depends on the other parameters as follows on the domain ? 2 > 4/3: 
  If m>? g>g, then ? V/? m= (? ? +?)m.  
  If ? g>m>g, then ? V/? m=?m. 
  If ? g>g>m, then ? V/? m=0. 
--So as g falls (-g increases), ? V/? m either does not change or else increases from ? V/? m=0 to 
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? V/? m=m or from ? V/? m=0 to ? V/? m=? m.  
--And as ?  falls (-?  increases), ? V/? m either does not change or else increases from ? V/? m=0 to 
? V/? m=m or from ? V/? m=0 to ? V/? m=? m.   
--And as ?  increases,  ? V/? m either does not change or else increases from ? V/? m=0 to ? V/? m=m 
or from ? V/? m=? m to ? V/? m= m. The rest of the proof proceeds in the same vein.Z 
     From the stated result it follows that ? * is monotone non-decreasing in (m, -g, -? ). The logic here 
is due to a theorem (6.1) by Topkis (1978) regarding some implications of supermodularity.  That ? * 
is monotone non-decreasing in (m, -g, -? ) can also be confirmed by inspection of (6).  Vertical 
integration is more likely, the greater is the marginal product of activities directed at counteracting 
externalities relative to the marginal product of activities directed at widening market coverage.  The 
upshot here is that in Japan, marketing channels with a high incidence of distribution keiretsu ought 
also to have a high concentration of foreign owned wholesalers. 
 
 
 3.  Empirical Analysis 
 
     Vertical integration between a foreign manufacturer and domestic wholesaler is an instance of 
foreign direct investment.  Japan? s stock of inward foreign direct investment is low in comparison to 
its outward stocks and in comparison to the inward stocks of the US and the EU.  One reason is the  
generally inhibiting policy of the Japanese government with respect to inward FDI, significantly 
relaxed only about 1980.2  There are probably other reasons too.   My point here though is just that 
any inhibition of inward FDI in Japan would have increased the costs to foreign manufacturers of 
administering directed marketing channels in Japan.  To put it another way, marketing channels in 
Japan with a high incidence of distribution keiretsu should have been both more likely to host foreign 
owned wholesale subsidiaries, and to the extent that FDI is impeded, less likely also to be penetrated 
by imports.  In the following we confront these hypotheses with data.  We find ample evidence for the 
first conjecture.  Foreign owned wholesale subsidiaries in 1997 were heavily concentrated in Japanese 
marketing channels with distribution keiretsu.  We also find support for the other point, albeit less 
conclusive.  Import penetration itself is slightly less in marketing channels with a high incidence of 
distribution keiretsu.  Perhaps this indicates that economic impediments to inward foreign direct 
investment in Japanese wholesaling were still present in 1997 even though de jure restrictions had 
been largely eliminated. 
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
a. Foreign Direct Investment 
                                                             
2On Japanese government restrictions on inward FDI refer to Flath (2000), p. 170, p. 172 and 
pp. 196-7.  
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         Our data on the Japan-based wholesale subsidiaries of foreign firms in 1997, are drawn from 
Touyou Keizai, Gaishi keikigyou souran (Survey of foreign affiliated companies in Japan), annual 
(since 1986).  This source lists basic data on virtually all the large, foreign-owned enterprises 
operating in Japan.  This listing includes all respondents with book value of equity exceeding 50 
million yen and with greater than 49 percent foreign ownership.3  About one third of these 1,372 large 
foreign subsidiaries operating in Japan in 1997 were primarily engaged in wholesaling, 468 firms in 
all.4  Clearly, wholesale affiliates of foreign firms comprise a significant portion of the stock of foreign 
direct investment in Japan.  Fukao and Ito (2001) make this same observation.  In fact, wholesaling is 
a sizeable focus of foreign direct investment generally, not only in Japan.  A recent study by  Hanson, 
Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) draws attention to the fact that 20% of the total worldwide sales of 
foreign affiliates of US multinationals were the sales of their foreign wholesale affiliates (at p. 25).   
     Touyou Keizai classifies the foreign affiliates by industry, including eleven subcategories within 
wholesale trade, and also lists the important products of each individual company.  From this 
information I have further classified the individual companies according to wholesale product lines 
corresponding to the 4 digit s.i.c. of the Census of Commerce of Japan, our source for other data.  I 
then aggregated the individual company employment within these 4 digit codes to produce EMP97.  
The variable EMPRAT97 scales these employment figures as percentages of the total employment in 
each wholesale line of business TOTEMP97 reported in the 1997 Census of Commerce of Japan, 
Report by Distribution Channel (Wholesaling), Table 2.   
     It was apparent from mere inspection of the data that the foreign affiliates in Japan? s wholesale 
industries are heavily concentrated in a few lines of business including machinery, medical 
instruments, precision instruments, automobiles, automobile parts, electric appliances and toiletries.  
All of these are products for which marketing has often entailed vertical restraints of one sort or 
another: manufacturer or wholesaler imposed customer assignments, price restrictions, and the like.  
 
b. Import Penetration 
                                                             
3It also includes those with greater than 20 percent foreign ownership if very large or 
important but only 10 of the 468 firms classified as wholesalers had less than 49 percent foreign 
ownership.   The modal firm among the 468 had 100 percent foreign ownership. 
4Besides the large firms, Touyou Keizai, Gaishi keikigyou soran also includes a separate listing 
(and selected data) for all foreign affiliates of whatever capitalization with more than 20 percent 




     Data on Japanese imports by wholesalers and on the scale of wholesale marketing channels is 
taken from the same source as the total employment figures (same table even): 1997 Census of 
Commerce of Japan, Report by Distribution Channel (Wholesaling), Table 2.  We collect the 
purchases from foreign sources by wholesalers operating in Japan FORPUR97, the annual sales by 
wholesalers, and their sales to other wholesalers.  Foreign purchases divided by the difference 
between total sales and sales to other wholesalers is an approximate measure of foreign penetration of 
each wholesale distribution channel IMPRAT97.  This is not quite the same as import penetration per 
se.  Some imports are sales from foreign suppliers directly to final demanders in Japan; they don? t go 
through wholesale channels and thus they escape the purview of the Census of Commerce.  But it 
turns out that most imports into Japan do go through wholesale establishments.  For the 1997 Census 
of Commerce period of observation (July 1, 1996 to June 30, 1997) value of imports into Japan 
reported by the Japan Tariff Association5 totaled 40 trillion yen compared to the 35 trillion yen total 
foreign purchases by Japanese wholesalers.  In other words, almost 90 percent of Japanese imports do 
arise as foreign purchases by wholesale establishments (including intracompany foreign shipments).   
     The wholesale establishments that are the objects of query in the Census of Commerce are 
classified by the 4 digit s.i.c. wholesale businesses in which they are principally engaged, with ones 
widely engaged in multiple lines of business classified as general trading companies.  The general 
trading companies?  19 trillion yen in foreign purchases comprised a little more than half of the total 
foreign purchases by all Japanese wholesalers in 1997.  Low foreign penetration of a wholesale 
marketing channel may well only mean that general trading companies, and not the more specialized 
wholesalers, are the dominant importers.6  And even the more specialized wholesalers are not 
perfectly specialized.  Foreign purchases by some wholesalers actually exceed the total imports of the 
commodities which they principally trade.  With these caveats in mind we nevertheless press ahead. 
 
      
c. Marketing Channel Characteristics 
     For core data on marketing channel characteristics we turn to the Medium and smaller enterprise 
agency, Basic Survey of Commercial Activity and Structure, for the Wholesale Industry of Japan 
(hereafter ? Basic Survey? ).   In 1979 and 1986 basic surveys included questions about respondents?  
arrangements with other firms.7 The 1979 and 1986 Basic Surveys (respectively, 4th and 5th surveys) 
report wholesalers?  survey responses regarding their participation in a contractual agreement 
(distribution keiretsu).  In the detailed instructions that accompanied the survey such an agreement is 
defined as one having any of the following stipulations: special dealing or preferential treatment in the 
                                                             
5Nihon kanzei kyoukai (Japan Tariff Association), gaikoku boueki gaikyou (Summary report 
on trade of Japan), Tokyo: The Association, (monthly). 
6Unfortunately the data presented in the Census of Commerce do not enable one to discern 
how the imports of general trading companies are distributed across commodities.  There does exist a 
detailed breakdown of their sales of each type of commodity. 
7The 1992 survey results are reported at a more aggregated level, not useful for our purpose.  
The 1998 survey does not include the distribution keiretsu queries. 
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sale of wares, capital assistance (i.e. equity participation), or management assistance including 
dispatch of employees.  The survey responses indicate whether the wholesaler is the initiator of such a 
(distribution keiretsu) agreement (and if so whether it pertains to the manufacturer, other wholesalers, 
or retailers), and whether it itself is subject to such an agreement (and if so whether this is at the 
initiative of a manufacturer or of other wholesalers).  The survey responses also ask respectively 
whether the wholesaler has proffered specific types of assistance to its suppliers or to its customers. 
     I have formed several variables from these data: fraction of wholesalers initiating a distribution 
keiretsu KSUR and fractions respectively initiating a distribution keiretsu involving other wholesalers 
KSURW and retailers KSURR.  Fraction of wholesalers entered into a distribution keiretsu inititiated 
by another firm KHAI, and the fractions respectively entered into a distribution keiretsu initiated by a 
manufacturer KHAIM and by another wholesaler KHAIW.  
     The means and standard deviations of the data items just described are listed in Table 1 and 
correlation matrices for some of them can be found in Table 2.   From the correlation matrix (Table 2) 
we can see that the correlation between KHAI and KHAIM is 0.98.  The correlation between KSUR 
and KSURR is 0.93.  The correlation between KHAI and KSUR is 0.86 and the correlation between 
KHAIM and KSUR is 0.79.   The typical pattern seems to be one in which a manufacturer imposes 
vertical restraints upon a wholesaler, who in turn itself imposes vertical restraints on retailers.  Also 
notice the positive correlations between foreign affiliate share of total wholesale employment 
EMPRAT97 and the fraction of wholesalers entered into a distribution keiretsu initiated by a 
manufacturer KHAIM: 0.45; and between EMPRAT97 and the fraction of wholesalers initiating a 
distribution keiretsu involving retailers KSUR: 0.45.  The foreign wholesale affiliates in 1997 were in 
this sense concentrated in marketing channels that in 1986 had a high incidence of distribution 
keiretsu. 
     Other relevant marketing channel characteristics include ones that fundamentally influence the 
marginal product of wholesale efforts at resolving externalities or at widening market coverage.  
Among these characteristics are the wholesale profit margin and the  number of wholesale steps. Also, 
whether the good is a consumer product or an industrial one, and if the former, the number of retail 
outlets.  The analysis of Nariu (1989) is helpful here.  Nariu explains how demanders?  information 
gathering behavior shapes the structure of marketing channels.  On one extreme are ? experience?  
goods that demanders purchase sequentially before finally settling on a permanent source of supply.  
At the other extreme are the ? search?  goods that demanders inform themselves about prior to 
purchase.  The choice between these two ways of gathering information is itself an economic one.  
Nondurable, standardized, small-ticket items tend to elicit ? experience? , while durable, expensive 
items, with varying complex features elicit the ? search?  strategy.  Effective marketing of experience 
goods requires maximum market coverage as demanders are likely to sample from the outlets closest 
to them.  Effective marketing of search goods requires promotion, advertising, and attention to the 
idiosyncratic variation in local demand all along the distribution channel.  For experience goods the 
market widening activities of wholesalers have a great marginal product.  For search goods efforts at 
resolving externalities along the distribution channel have a high marginal product.  The experience 
goods tend to be standardized items with low wholesale profit margins, many final outlets, and 
multiple wholesale steps.  Industrial marketing channels generally do not have retail outlets and to 
that extent entail fewer externalities than do marketing channels for consumer products.  In line with 
this discussion I have collected several pertinent variables from the Census of Commerce and the 
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Basic Survey:  
 
from the 1986 Basic Survey: 
NETPROFR = the average wholesale profit to sales ratio;  
 
and from the 1997 Census of Commerce:  
WW97 the fraction of total wholesale sales that were to other wholesalers? a proxy for the 
number of wholesale steps,  
 
CONSUMER= a dummy variable equal to one if the product line is a consumer item and zero 
otherwise , and 
  
CONXSTOR =  the number of retailers in Japan specializing in sale of such items if they are 
consumer products and equal to zero otherwise.   
 
Again, the means and standard deviations of all these and the other variables are in Table 1.  We now 
turn to the statistical analysis of these data. 
 
Results 
     Our research focus is the interdependence between employment in foreign affiliate wholesalers, 
marketing channel characteristics including incidence of distribution keiretsu, and foreign penetration 
of wholesale distribution channels.  We hypothesize that marketing channels with  vertical restraints 
(distribution keiretsu) are more likely to elicit the establishment of foreign wholesale affiliates.  If 
there are no impediments to FDI then the marketing channels with distribution keiretsu should be no 
less penetrated than others even in spite of their implied higher incidence of FDI.  To the extent that 
FDI is inhibited, marketing channels with distribution keiretsu are less likely to be penetrated by 
imports.  Additionally, to the extent that FDI is inhibited, such FDI as does exist ought to induce 
greater import penetration.  To fully explore these possibilities requires a two equation system such as 
Yamawaki (1991) used to analyse Japanese direct investments in U.S. wholesaling.  In this kind of 
specification foreign import penetration both induces the establishment of foreign wholesale affiliates 
and is itself enhanced by it.  
     Simultaneity bias is of concern so we begin the analysis with estimates of reduced form equations. 
 The Table 3 includes estimates of two sets of reduced form equations.  The dependent variables are 
respectively EMPRAT97 and IMPRAT97.  These are the employment share of the large Japan-based 
wholesale subsidiaries of foreign firms and the foreign purchases of Japan-based wholesalers as a 
fraction of their total sales not to other wholesalers. To address the problem of limited dependent 
variable I also estimated the EMPRAT97 equations using Tobit analysis, easily accomplished with the 
SHAZAM software.  The resulting regression coefficient estimates and t-statistics are very close to 
the OLS values.  These reduced form estimates show that marketing channels with distribution 
keiretsu (high values for KHAIM) tend to have both higher foreign affiliate employment shares and 
less import penetration.  Wholesale marketing channels for consumer products tend to have more 
foreign wholesale affiliate employment, and those that have more retail outlets tend to have less 
import penetration.  None of the other variables even approach statistical significance.  The structural 
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equations are more revealing. 
     The  Table 4 depicts my estimates of the structural equations explaining import shares and FDI 
(foreign affiliate employment shares).  For the import share IMPRAT97 equation this entails a 2SLS 
estimation procedure.  This was not possible for the foreign direct investment EMPRAT97 equation 
because of the lack of identifying instruments.  So instead of an instrumental variable procedure I 
substituted an earlier observation for import share IMPRAT82 as a right hand side variable in the 
equation explaining EMPRAT97.  I estimated this equation using  both OLS and Tobit.  The results 
of these differ little and are highly satisfactory.  All of the variables are of the expected sign and 
statistically significant and together they explain most of the variation in the foreign wholesale affiliate 
employment share.  The import rate equation also has the predicted signs but a much worse fit.  As 
conjectured, import penetration both elicits wholesale foreign direct investment and is itself possibly 
encouraged by it.  Furthermore, in marketing channels where manufacturers form more of the 
wholesalers into distribution keiretsu (KHAIM is greater) the employment share of foreign wholesale 
affiliates is greater.  Import penetration seems to be less in these same marketing channels which 
might indicate continuing inhibitions on FDI.  Channels for CONSUMER products also elicit more 
foreign direct investment and induce slightly less import penetration.  Consumer products with more 
retail stores CONXSTOR also elicit more wholesale foreign direct investment.  Beyond this, 
wholesale product lines with higher  average profit to sales ratios NETPROFR and fewer wholesale 
steps WW97 also tend to elicit more wholesale foreign direct investment. All of this comports with 
our expectation.  In short, the equations expose the important empirical determinates of the pattern of 
foreign direct investment across Japanese wholesale industries.  They also provide qualified support 
for the findings of Yamawaki (1991) that wholesale foreign direct investment not only follows import 
penetration but also promotes it.   
 
 
 4. Conclusion 
 
     This paper has made a modest contribution to the theory of vertical integration and has attempted 
to expose the empirical relationship between foreign direct investment in Japanese wholesaling, 
distribution keiretsu and import penetration.   The theoretical innovation is to identify market-
widening efforts and  resolution of externalities (through administration of a distribution keiretsu) as 
fundamentally competing activities.  They may both have value, but the better performance of the one 
task raises the costs of the other.  To integrate manufacturing and wholesaling can entail the decision 
to forego market widening efforts altogether to more perfectly resolve externalities.  Dealing through 
an independent wholesaler might entail the opposite.  In either case the firm achieves a second-best 
only.  These ideas have application to the pattern of foreign direct investment in Japanese 
wholesaling, for such investment is indeed an example of vertical integration of manufacturing and 
wholesaling.  In full accord with the logic just related, we have found that marketing channels in 
Japan with a higher incidence of distribution keiretsu are more likely than others to host wholesalers 
that are subsidiaries of foreign manufacturing companies. 
     We have also found evidence that inhibitions on inward FDI still existed in Japan in 1997.  Japan, 
compared to the other developed nations, has long had a vanishingly small stock of inward foreign 
direct investment.  There are many possible explanations.  Before 1980, government regulations in 
 
 12 
Japan were quite inhibiting, as well-documented by Mason (1992).  Since then the flow of FDI into 
Japan has expanded, but the stock still remains small compared to what is observed in the US or the 
EU.  Perhaps this reflects indigenous factors other than government regulation that make it difficult 
for foreigners to live and work in Japan or to set up businesses there.  These factors include the 
employment practices of the large Japanese firms that make it difficult to hire executives in mid-career 
(as suggested by Weinstein (1996)), and also include the myriad difficulties foreigners encounter in 
mastering the Japanese language and culture.  As already mentioned, we have found that foreign 
penetration of Japanese product markets that elicit distribution keiretsu is likely to be accompanied by 
direct investment.  We have also found that import penetration itself is less likely in these same 
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distribution keiretsu initiated by other wholesalers 
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Fraction of wholesalers themselves having 
initiated distribution keiretsu 
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 0.103  
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Fraction of wholesalers having initiated 
distribution keiretsu in their dealings with other 
wholesalers 
 
Basic Survey (table 
54) 
 





Fraction of wholesalers having initiated 
distribution keiretsu in their dealings with retailers 
 
Basic Survey (table 
54) 
 
 0.040  
(0.034) 
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 IMPRAT97   0.03       
 KHAI 0.43 -0.22      
 KHAIM 0.45 -0.19 0.98     
 KHAIW 0.06 -0.17 0.40 0.21    
 KSUR 0.45 -0.16 0.86 0.79 0.60   
 KSURW 0.40 -0.24 0.68 0.60 0.56 0.74  
 KSURR 0.32 -0.16 0.72 0.61 0.67 0.93 0.54 





 IMPRAT82 0.38        
 EMPRAT97 -0.07 0.01       
 KHAIM    -0.21 -0.18 0.65      
 CONSUMER -0.21 -0.38 0.27 -0.03     
 CONXSTOR -0.32 -0.24 0.17 0.18 0.52    
 NETPROFR 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.36 -0.02   
 WW97     -0.01 0.26 -0.44 -0.48 -0.16 -0.19 -0.01  
 IMPRAT97  IMPRAT82  EMPRAT97  KHAIM  CONSUMER  CONXSTOR  NETPROFR  
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Table 3. Regression Estimates; Reduced Forms  
        
 Coefficients and t -stats* 
         
        
           Tobit*            OLS             OLS  
         
dependent var ?  EMPRAT97   EMPRAT97    IMPRAT97  
  P-value  P-value   P-value 
?  independent var          
 KHAIM     0.084   0.112   -0.163  
 (3.988) 0.000  (4.149) 0.000  (-1.385) 0.171 
 CONSUMER  0.008   0.009   -0.004  
 (1.546) 0.127  (1.374) 0.170  (-0.147) 0.884 
 CONXSTOR  -0.000   -0.000   -0.000  
 (-0.893) 0.375  (-0.500) 0.617  (-1.531) 0.130 
 NETPROFR  -0.075   0.090   -0.604  
 (-0.483) 0.631  (0.437) 0.662  (-0.687) 0.494 
 WW97      -0.015   -0.028   -0.076  
 (-0.604) 0.548  (-0.903) 0.367  (-0.563) 0.576 
 CONSTANT  0.004   -0.009   0.189  
 (0.311) 0.757  (-0.504) 0.614  (2.532) 0.014 
         
  R-SQUARE       0.50   0.09  







0.27        
         74 OBS          74 OBS          74 OBS 
 




Table 4. Regression Estimates: Structural Equations  
 
 
 Coefficients and t -stats* 
        
         Tobit*      OLS         2SLS**   
         
dependent var ?  EMPRAT97   EMPRAT97    IMPRAT97  
   P-value  P-value   P-value 
?  independent var         
 EMPRAT97       8.378  
       (1.049) 0.298 
 IMPRAT82  0.092   0.066     
 (4.481) 0.000  (3.936) 0.000    
 KHAIM     0.091   0.081   -0.886  
 (7.027) 0.000  (7.489) 0.000  (-1.235) 0.221 
 CONSUMER  0.018   0.015   -0.072  
 (4.998) 0.000  (5.342) 0.000  (-1.212) 0.230 
 CONXSTOR  -0.000   -0.000     
 (-1.829) 0.067  (-2.183) 0.034    
 NETPROFR  0.394   0.251     
 (3.549) 0.000  (2.910) 0.005    
 WW97      -0.025   -0.013     
 (-1.851) 0.064  (-1.193) 0.239    
 CONSTANT  -0.031   -0.022   0.175  
 (-3.169) 0.002  (-2.795) 0.007  (3.101) 0.003 
         
  R-SQUARE        0.67     







0.70      0.026  
         57 OBS          57 OBS          74 OBS  
* The coefficients of the Tobit equation are those of the non -normalized variables.  
**Instruments for the 2SLS estimation: khaim,  consumer, conxstor, netprofr, ww97.  
 
